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FROM 9/11 TO IRAQ: ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE RHETORIC
OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION LEADING TO THE WAR IN IRAQ

A Project
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
Communication Studies

by
LaKesha Nicole Covington
December 2005


FROM 9/11 TO IRAQ: ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE RHETORIC
OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION LEADING TO THE WAR IN IRAQ

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ABSTRACT

In 2003, when the current war in Iraq began, I became interested in learning how and why President Bush declared the first pre-emptive war in the nation's history with the support of the American people. In order to determine how the country was led to war, the project posed the following research questions: What rhetorical event(s) led President George W. Bush to declare war on Iraq with the support of the majority of Americans? How did the Bush Administration manage the crises that developed in response to these rhetorical events and situations?

To provide an answer to the research questions, this project investigated the events that occurred from September 11, 2001 and ended with the first pre-emptive attacks that took place on March 19, 2003. Research included analysis of letters, media coverage and other materials used to make the case for war, such as neo-conservatives, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and the Project for the New American Century.

As this project is a critical analysis of rhetorical events and situations, the primary research method used was qualitative analysis. The project provided a critical assessment of the events that led to the war and offers an

explanation of how Americans were apparently so easily misled to support the first pre-emptive war in its history. The project also demonstrates how the Bush Administration rhetoric, propaganda, and the fear of the American public after September 11, 2001 led to the push for another war in Iraq.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost I would like to begin by saying thank you to Dr. Donna Simmons, the Chair of my Graduate Committee. I appreciate your willingness to see my project through although you had other obligations. I will be eternally grateful for the faith that you had in me, as well as the guidance that you provided me with during this long process. Dr. Simmons, you have truly been one of the most influential mentors I have had in my educational career. I would also like to thank Dr. C. Mo Bahk and Dr. Victoria Seitz, my Graduate Committee members. Thank you for your patience throughout this process and for providing your valuable input. To my family and friends, if it were not for you, I am not sure I would have had the strength to pursue my Master's degree when faced with adversity. I appreciate your continued prayers and support. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. Without him, none of the things that I have been able to accomplish would have been possible.

I would like to dedicate this project to the brave men and women of the United States Armed Forces. I honor and respect all that you do for this country and our freedom.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

How does one define war? According to Mish (1989), war is defined in the following way:

1. a state or period of usually open and declared armed fighting between states or nations, 2. the art or science of warfare, 3. a state of hostility, conflict, or antagonism, and 4. a struggle between opposing forces for a particular end. (p. 820)

Although Mish provides a textbook definition of war, is this a reflection of what war has come to mean in the 21st century? What does the word war truly mean? Is it one country dropping bombs on another country? Is war a strong country invading a smaller, weaker neighbor and dominating them? Essentially, Mish's definition lacks the basic answers to the questions about what leads to war.

Since the beginning of human history, battles have been won and lost. People have fought and died for causes they believed in. An early and influential military battle was the Greek-Persian Wars, fought from 499-488 BC. The first wave of Crusader- Turkish Wars were fought from

1100-1146, the German Civil War lasted from 1100-1106, and the second Norman-Byzantine War was fought from 1100-1108.

The United States also has a history of war. In the formative years of the country, several wars were fought on American soil. These wars included the French and Indian War (1754-1763), the Revolutionary War (1775-1783), and the Civil War (1861-1865). The United States has also fought wars in other places. The earliest of these wars was the Spanish-American War, which was fought in 1898 in Cuba. From 1914-1918, World War I raged on in Europe. The United States entered World War I in 1917 with the sinking of the Lusitania. Twenty-one years later, World War II, which began in 1939 and ended in 1945, had Europe in the grips of war yet again. The United States entered this conflict when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in 1941. Later wars included the Korean War (1950-1953), the Vietnam War (1957-1975), and the Persian Gulf War (1991). The most recent war to be waged is the current conflict in Iraq.

In the past, the United States entered conflicts to defend itself when it was attacked, defend its economic and political interests, or to defend other nations. For instance, the United States entered the first Gulf War

when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The Gulf War demonstrates the United States' desire protect weaker nations. When the United States was attacked on September 11, 2001, the country entered in to a conflict in the hills of Afghanistan. The goal of this conflict was remove the Taliban regime from power, topple the Al Qaeda network, and capture the mastermind behind the September 11th terrorist attacks, Osama bin Laden. However, this changed when members of the Bush Administration began to push for pre-emptive war to be launched in Iraq. A pre-emptive war occurs when a nation attacks another nation without being attacked first.

On March 19, 2003, President George W. Bush began the second war in Iraq with bombings of the country when then leader Saddam Hussein refused to leave the country. The bombings on March 19th became the first time that the United States launched a pre-emptive war on another country.

Purpose of the Project

Ever inquisitive (a trait that I developed as a child and honed as a reporter in high school), I became interested in the war that is being fought in Iraq. I was

very skeptical when President Bush initiated war on Iraq in 2003 and became interested in learning how and why the President to declare the first pre-emptive war in the nation's history supported by the American people. As a result, the following research questions were posed for this project: What rhetorical event(s) led President George W. Bush to declare war on Iraq with the support of the majority of Americans? How did the Bush Administration manage the crises that developed in response to these rhetorical events and situations?

Scope of the Project

The project investigated the events that led the United States from September 11, 2001 to the current war in Iraq. The specific time frame examined was the period beginning on September 11, 2001 and ending with the first pre-emptive attacks in Iraq on March 19, 2003. Research on the events that led to the war included analysis of letters, media coverage and other materials used to make the case for war, such as the neo-conservatives, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), and The Project for the New American Century.

Significance of the Project

The project and the investigation contained therein have practical applications for the field of Communications and society as a whole. Message is a primary focus of communication research. It is also a primary element of communication. It is important to be critical thinkers and consider the meaning behind the message. People are influenced of the media. People are also influenced by the images that the media portrays on a daily basis. For instance, they saw pictures of Iraqi citizens celebrating when the statue of Saddam Hussein was torn down and were given the impression that the country as a whole was glad to have the presence of the United States in their country. However, this is not necessarily what is currently going on in Iraq. The insurgency in Iraq and the United States' inability to end it can suggest that perhaps many Iraqis do not want the United States in their country. According to Whitlock (2004), the insurgency in Iraq consists of different factions of Iraqi, not foreign fighters.

The project will show how the Bush Administration rhetoric, propaganda, and the fear of the American public after September 11, 2001 led to the push for another war

in Iraq. The rhetoric and propaganda used by the Bush Administration is extremely significant because it demonstrates that members of the administration first convinced President Bush, then the American people that Iraq should be invaded and Saddam Hussein deposed.

Theoretical Perspectives

Three theoretical perspectives can be used explain the use of rhetoric and propaganda by the Bush Administration. The perspectives discussed include: 1. The Communication Model, 2. Persuasive Appeals, and 3. Agenda Setting.

The first perspective used to explain the use of rhetoric and propaganda is the Communication Model or more specifically the Transactional Model of Communication. According to Jaffe (2004), the model contains the following elements: the sender, encoding the message, message channel, the receiver, decoding the message, encoding feedback, the feedback channel, decoding the feedback, the specific situation, and noise. Jaffe also states that messages are intentional. Griffin (2003) further defines the message as, "The information conveyed by the speaker to the audience. Messages can be verbal or

nonverbal." (p. 12) As stated previously, message is a primary focus of communications research.

Hitler's messages before and during World War II are a prime example of how messages can influence the Communication Model. During their control of the German government, Hitler and the Nazi party exerted influence over every aspect of communication. For instance, the sender of all messages to the German people was the Nazis. As a matter of fact, Hitler appointed Joseph Goebbels to the position of Propaganda Minister, allowing for absolute control over who provided the German people with information. The message channel is another example of how Hitler's message influenced the Communication Model. In Germany and Nazi occupied territories, Hitler controlled how and where people obtained their information from. For instance, the Nazis controlled newspapers as well as radio.

A second perspective can explain how rhetoric and propaganda can effectively influence was persuasive appeals. Griffin (2003) claims that:

Emotional appeals, or pathos can be one of the most challenging aspects of persuasion. On the one hand, research suggests that speakers persuade only when they appeal to emotions. Appeals to emotions can be powerful because they encourage your audience to

relate to an issue on an internal, personal level.
(p. 432)

Griffin also identifies emotions that are primary and secondary when speaking about persuasive appeals, and one emotion that is not identified as either primary or secondary. The primary emotions include: 1. Fear, 2. Anger, 3. Surprise, 4. Sadness, 5. Disgust, and 6. Happiness. The secondary emotions include: 1. Pride, 2. Guilt, and 3. Shame. The final emotion that is common to persuasive appeals, but is neither primary nor secondary, is reverence.

Emotional appeals in propaganda during times of war influenced people in different ways depending on what persuasive appeal was used. For example, during World War II Hitler used fear to persuade German citizens. Hitler had the German people convinced that Jews were evil, mongrels, and rapists bent on destroying the Aryan race. The Nazi's were also famous for using propaganda that encouraged the German people to be proud of their Aryan heritage. After September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration appealed to the American people's fear of another terrorist attack to justify invading Iraq.

A third theory that informs this project is Agenda Setting Theory. According to the University of Twente website (2004), the agenda setting theory has several assumptions related to it. The website states that agenda-setting is when public awareness and concern of relevant issues is created by the news media. The University of Twente claims the two basic assumptions that underlie most research on agenda-setting are:

- (1). The press and the media do not reflect reality; they filter and shape it; (2) media concentration on a few issues and subjects lead the public to perceive those issues as more important than other issues.

According to McCombs and Shaw (1972), "In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality." (p. 176) McCombs and Shaw also state that not only do the readers of this information learn about a given issue, but how much importance should be placed on that issue from the amount of information that is provided in the news story and the position that it takes. Essentially the media then sets the "agenda."

Cook (2000) also comments on the use of agenda-setting. According to Cook:

When policy requires the assent of others, media strategies are useful for persuading others to act.

As face-to-face communication has become more difficult with the growing reach of government, the increasing number of participants and the dispersion of authority, media persuasion is a more attractive and efficient use of resources. (p. 215)

Cook (2000) claims that by using the media, those who make decisions about policy can express their opinion, comment on current events, and try to persuade the masses. Cook also asserts that:

The publicity provided by the news media can offer key assistance to officials here in two ways. First, public opinion tends to see those issues discussed in the news as more likely to judge politicians by their stances on those issues . . . Second, even if public opinion is not activated, politicians respond differently to more salient issues . . . [I]ncreasing the visibility of a particular issue also enhances the odds that political actors will do something about it in a way that is responsive to public attention. (pp. 215-216)

Campbell, Martin, and Fabos (2000) state the following about inquiries on agenda-setting, "Like uses and gratifications, agenda-setting research has tried to strike a balance between the views of the mass media as all-powerful and barely powerful." (p. 470) Siune and Borre (1975) studied agenda-setting in a Danish election. The study examined the following aspects of the Danish election: political broadcasts from both radio and television. These broadcasts included debates, programs made by the political party, and programs where the

candidates were asked questions by journalists and Danish citizens. According to Siune and Borre (1975):

This study suggests three kinds of agenda-setting effects. The first is the degree to which the media reflect the public agenda, called *representation*. In a representational agenda, the public influences the media. The second is the maintenance of the same agenda by the public the entire time, which is called *persistence*. In a persistent public agenda, the media may have little effect. The third kind of effect—media influencing the public—is exactly what classic agenda-setting theory predicts. (cited in Littlejohn 1999, p. 347)

Siune and Burre (1975) also discovered that the programs with the most persuasive effect, were those that the Danish citizens set the media agenda.

Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2004) conducted a study on the presidential influence over the systematic agenda. In their study, Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake examined the effects of the president's influence over systematic agenda issues such as civil rights policy, clean air policy, and domestic farm policy. According to Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake, ". . . we argue that the president's success in affecting media attention to issues may differ depending on policy type." (p. 182) Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake used Vector Autoregression analysis to analyze data collected from 1950-1988 to determine how much the president's statements on the aforementioned policy issues affect

media attention to the issues. The primary independent variable for the study was presidential attention and the primary dependent variable was media attention to policy issues. The findings of the study showed that presidential influence over civil rights policy and media attention had mixed success over the time period examined. The study also demonstrated that presidential attention to clean air policy also caused the media to the policy. Finally, presidential attention to domestic farm policy also affects institutional attention.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Before investigating the events that led the country from September 11, 2001 to war being declared on March 19, 2003, one must understand the rhetorical nature of war itself. Stated more specifically, one must also understand the rhetoric of propaganda used during times of war and conflict. According to Lasswell (1927) propaganda can be defined as, "the management of opinions and attitudes by the direct manipulation of social suggestion rather than by altering other conditions in the environment or in the organism." (cited in Finch 2000, p. 368) Further distinction can be made about the use of propaganda during periods of war. According to Lutz (1933), "War propaganda did not originate in 1914; the oldest military treatise in the world, *The Art of War*, by Sun Tsu, described the technique 2,400 years ago." (cited in Read 1972, p. 1) A wealth of information exists on the subject of propaganda use during times of war. Those who use propaganda also walk a line between what is the truth and what is a lie. According to Dyer (1942):

the differences between the effect on the people of propaganda and a Strategy of Truth may be more

apparent than real. We have said that *all* propaganda winks at truth. There are certain devices and rules which make propaganda effective. (p. 80)

Dyer suggests successful propaganda is that which emphasizes extremes and seldom admits a middle ground. Propaganda also leads a propagandist to take part of the truth and dress it up in either black or white. The result: statements that are part truth and part lie.

One way to understand how propaganda has been used during times of war and conflict is to divide the literature review into three sections: World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Each section ends with a discussion about the propaganda films that emerged from Hollywood during each period. Films have become one of the most influential mediums of our time. Films have the ability to cross over many social divides that other mediums cannot. In the United States for instance, there are people who cannot read, speak English, or are poorly educated. Film can overcome these divides. From the time of its invention through the Cold War, films have been used as a form of war propaganda by Hollywood. It is for this reason that film propaganda during each period of war will be examined.

World War I

When the first Great War began in Europe in 1914, America took the position that it would remain neutral in the conflict. However, with the sinking of the Lusitania, the country officially entered the war. Before the sinking of the Lusitania, the British supplied America with encouragement to support the Allies. According to Buitenhuis (1987):

The most complex and important role of Wellington House was to persuade the people of the United States that the Allied cause was just and necessary, that they should support the Allied war effort and, ultimately, that they should join the war on the Allied side. (p. 54)

According to Buitenhuis (1987) the British employed the efforts of well-known authors James Barrie and A.E.W. Mason to convince Americans to support the war effort. According to Bruntz (1972), once the United States entered the war, President Wilson realized that there was a need for a propaganda agency. According to Woodrow Wilson's State Papers and Addresses (1918), as a result, "On April 14, 1917, just eight days after war was declared, he created, by executive order, the Committee on Public Information." (cited in Bruntz 1972, p. 31) The members of the Committee on Public Information (CPI) included the

Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and Mr. George Creel who was the civilian chairman. The CPI employed many writers and used thousands of people in America to its advantage. The purpose of the CPI was to gain American support for entering the war. Creel said:

There was no part of the Great War machinery we did not touch, no medium of appeal that we did not employ. The printed word, the spoken word, the signboard—all these were used in our campaign to make our people and all other people understand the cause that compelled America to take arms in defense of its liberties and free institutions. (cited in Bruntz 1972, p. 32)

According to Blakey (1970) the CPI distributed numerous publications, "By the end of the war 2,499,903 copies were in circulation and historians had established themselves and pamphleteering as effective agents of literary propaganda." (p. 34)

According to Lasswell (1971) creating the CPI was equivalent to Wilson creating a separate cabinet, whose sole responsibility was propaganda. Mock and Larson (1968) stated that:

Without specific powers of enforcement, the CPI thus enjoyed censorship power which was tantamount to direct legal force, although this was energetically denied by the Committee during the war. The CPI insisted that it was merely an intermediary between law-enforcement bodies and the people. (p. 20)

Mock and Larson (1968) also claim that CPI's representatives and agents were not able to make arrests, they didn't often threaten either, but those organizations that failed to keep the secrecy and patriotism according to the Committee's standards could be handed over to the appropriate agency for action. The CPI provided their foreign agents with a steady stream of propaganda, as a matter of fact, Mock and Larson claim:

By the time of the Armistice, the name of Woodrow Wilson, and a general idea that he was friend of peace, liberty, and democracy, were nearly as familiar in some of the remote places of the earth as they were in New York, St. Louis, or San Francisco. (p. 235)

One method of transmitting propaganda to the public that was used during WWI was the Four Minute Men. One of the directors of the Four Minute Men, McCormick Blair (1918) gave the following account of the organization's origin:

War was inevitable; how could the people of this country be made to realize the seriousness of the situation? . . . And then one night someone spoke of the tremendous movie audiences and how much could be accomplished if the audience could only be reached. In less time than it takes to tell, it was agreed to enlist the support of movie managers in Chicago and get together a body of men who would speak during intermission, these men to speak only four minutes (largely because that was found to be the exact time available) and be called the Four Minute Men. (cited in Corneise 1984, p. 1)

According to Cornebise (1984), Creel noted there was a need for verbal communication during the Great War because many citizens of the United States were born in foreign countries and could not read English. When the Four Minute Men first formed the organization in 1917, the group spoke in Chicago theatres. Arrangements were made with the managers of the theaters and the group was introduced to the audience through the use of slides, which projected the names of the each member of the group. The slides also stated that the Four Minute Men would be speaking for four minutes on a subject that was of national importance. Cornebise also mentions that the speeches of the Four Minute Men were blatantly propagandistic and designed to counter the efforts of the Germans. The Four Men were provided with the necessary information that they needed. Cornebise claims that one of the most successful Four Minute Men bulletins was No. 35, *Where Did You Get Your Facts?* The bulletin encouraged American citizens to challenge those who provide them with false information.

In Britain, propaganda was handled by two fronts during World War I. According to Messinger (1992),

propagandists like Masterman, Parker, Brice, and Buchan directed their propaganda work towards the civilian population in Britain. On the military end, the War Office directed their propaganda to speak to others in uniform, more specifically the War Office dealt with the enemy. Messinger also states that the British government was blind to the potential that the use of propaganda posed. According to Messinger, Sir George Cockerill, head of the Special Intelligence Section, was the first to begin to analyze the propaganda literature that Germany was distributing through the mail. British propaganda organizations also acted as censors, like the CPI in the United States. According to Peterson (1939), "The first propaganda organization to be set in motion was that of censorship. On August 5, 1914, the British cut the cables between Germany and the United States." (p. 12) The cutting of the cables allowed the British to restrict the Germans most effective means of propaganda, the news. Restricting the flow of information at this point in the war was crucial because many people were forming opinions about what was going on in Europe.

Propaganda is often used to provide information that portrays the disseminator in the most positive light and

portrays the opponent in a negative light. However, there are other uses for propaganda. According to Lasswell (1971), "A large element in propaganda against the enemy is the invention of ways and means for the transmission of suggestions to the enemy." (p. 177) According to Bruntz (1972), American pamphlets were also distributed to soldiers on the German lines. These pamphlets claimed that America was not fighting the German people, but the German Autocrats and said that there would be peace once the government was removed. America's wish during the war was to protect people from the Kaiser and to protect democracy. Bruntz also claims that American propagandists would distribute thousands of postcards to the German trenches, which had blanks for the finders to fill out in case he was taken prisoner that the soldier could mail to his relatives. Bruntz (1972) also said:

The significant fact is that the Allies seemed as busy discovering new ways to send paper "bullets" over the lines as they were at inventing new implements of warfare with which to fire bullets of steel at the enemy. Bullets are important, but so is a strong morale—a will to victory. (pp. 65-67)

Another method that was used during World War I was propaganda of despair. Bruntz (1972) states that this was the second phase of propaganda that was used by the Allied

propagandists and that the leaflets' goal was to bring despair to German soldiers. Soldiers were given leaflets that claimed that they were in the fields of death and asked them why they were among the dead. He states that the propaganda stated that:

It was futile, according to Allied propagandists, for the Germans to make further efforts to break the power of the Allies. The only result of these efforts would be death and the grave . . . A great deal of propaganda of despair had in it a touch of sentimentalism. It called attention to the suffering of the wives and children of the soldiers. (Bruntz, 1972, p. 102-103)

Other methods of using despair in propaganda included painting a picture of the rewards that awaited crippled soldiers when they returned home, according to Bruntz. The allies circulated stories about veterans of past wars dying of hunger. Some leaflets depicted crippled soldiers in front of hotels with rich and healthy (robust) patrons coming out of restaurants and ignoring them.

The Allied forces were not the only ones distributing information to enemy soldiers. According to Messinger (1992):

The Germans also undertook a propaganda offensive against enemy troops. The *Gazette des Ardennes* was an example. This illustrated, French-language newspaper was distributed over enemy lines by balloon and aeroplane. It was read with interest by many

troops, particularly because the Germans cleverly included information on French prisoners. (p. 17)

Messinger also claims that Germany distributed information in Russian in some areas of the eastern front and information was provided in English for Americans who were traveling through Germany and Austria.

During World War I, German use of propaganda was very extensive. According to Messinger (1992) the German press was organized for the war effort. The domestic press was provided with lists weekly of topics that were not to be covered and given advice about attitudes that should be adopted regarding subjects that were sensitive. The circulation of these papers included countries like Switzerland, Holland, and Scandinavia. German embassies in neutral countries supported the publication of newspapers in German and the local language.

Hollywood Film Propaganda During WWI

According to Fyne (1994) Hollywood propaganda began to be used before the beginning of the Spanish-American war. On April 21, 1898 entrepreneurs of the film industry, J. Stuart Blackton and Albert E. Smith, watched people celebrating and waving the American flag in the streets when Congress declared war against Spain and got

the idea for a film. As a result, the pair created *Tearing Down the Spanish Flag*, which depicted the U.S. Army's capture of the installation in Havana, even though the event had not happened yet. During World War I, Fyne also claims that in Hollywood propagandists took advantage of the opportunity to create films depicting the Germans in an unfavorable light. These films portrayed the German "Huns" as barbarians that were uncivilized and depraved. Two titles were *The Hun Within* and *To Hell with the Kaiser*. By the time the war had ended in 1918, audiences in America were exposed to dozens of silent propaganda movies that justified the war. In Russia, film was used to overcome the language and education barriers and promote the position of the Bolsheviks and Lenin. One early example of this was a film that used the familiar figure of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, a person that even illiterate Russians could identify. In 1925, Russian propagandists also produced *The Battleship Potemkin*, which justified the Bolshevik Revolution. Other Russian propaganda films included *Mother*, *The End of St. Petersburg*, and *Storm over Asia*.

Not all propaganda films during WWI portrayed war in a favorable light. The movie *All Quiet on the Western*

Front was pacifist. It displayed German soldiers in a different light from how they had previously been portrayed in films. The movie did not portray the glorious battle scenes, but isolation and death:

The clean cut-cut, young German soldiers, fresh from their local gymnasiums, resembled any American fellow walking down Main Street, hand in hand with his steady girl. In their native way, these German lads sought only friendship and romance, two pursuits that were interrupted when the Kaiser's call to arms dropped them on the European charnel fields. (Fyne, 1994, p. 6)

World War II

Adolf Hitler was perhaps the most successful at using propaganda to achieve his objectives. Hitler's use of propaganda was so successful that the German people were convinced that Jews and other groups were inferior to the Aryan race. Hitler acknowledged the power of propaganda in war efforts. According to Adolf Hitler:

arguably the greatest fan of British WWI propaganda, stridently believed that the British secured military victory *primarily* because of the effective propaganda campaigns the government launched on their own citizens throughout the war. (Hitler 1943, cited in Finch, 2000, p. 373)

Winkler (1978) commented on Germany's skill in the use of propaganda during World War II. According to Winkler, no American propagandist could match the power of the German

Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels. Goebbels exerted total control over radio, the press, and other forms of expression in the Nazi state. He viewed propaganda as a means to control every aspect of life. He also adopted Hitler's view that the ability of the masses to understand information was very limited and they must be provided with slogans over and over again. All propaganda under Goebbels appealed to German citizen's instincts and emotions, not their rational processes.

Finch (2000) also stated that during war, propaganda through radio broadcasts was the most effective at planting a seed of mistrust in political leaders. During World War II the Japanese used announcer Tokyo Rose on radio broadcasts to undermine the morale of Australian citizens by naming supposed targets in rural towns. Hitler used radio and short wave radio to spread propaganda as well. According to Childs and Whitton (1942), ". . . Hitler's armed forces wrought an equally striking transformation upon American public opinion. By the end of June, only a minority of the American people thought England and France could win." (p. 98)

America also used radio to spread propaganda during this period. According to Horten (2002), however, there

were several factors that limited the effects of this propaganda:

. . . whereas the networks eagerly collaborated with the government propaganda agencies and tried to remain in good standing with the FCC, they certainly did not risk disputing their regular, profitable prime-time schedules. The second factor that limited the effectiveness of this radio propaganda certainly had to do with America's legacies—from both World War I and the New Deal. As some letters and opinion polls amply certified, Americans did not swallow government propaganda hook, line, and sinker. (p. 63)

In Nazi Germany, the government used propaganda to instill fear. In particular the swastika was used to incite fear. However, the swastika is not necessarily inherently fear-provoking. According to Heller (2004):

Of course not everyone who lived under the Nazi symbol was afraid of its powers. To the contrary, millions were emboldened by it. The ancient mark symbolized good fortune of the German people to have leader who rekindled their collective greatness. Yet in order to do so he instilled in the majority fear of his minority enemies through regular propaganda blitzes. (p. 850)

Heller (2004) claims that one weapon of hate that was used by the Nazi's was *Der Stürmer* (The Stormer). This weekly newspaper, which was anti-Semitic, was produced by the Nuremberg war criminal Julius Streicher. The paper covered the "crimes" of the Jews, which included ritual murder and savage rape. On the bottom of the publication the motto, "The Jew Is Our Misery," was printed. The

masthead lettering of the newspaper was black and spikey. The sole purpose of the newspaper was to slander the "mongrel" Jewish population. Heller states, "Fear triggers hatred and inflames ignorance, which the skilled propagandists converts into manifestations of terror." (p. 854).

In 1942 the United States used images of the Japanese demon, which had bucked-teeth and four eyes. Heller also suggests uses of grotesque images such as these were just as powerful as if the allies had dropped bombs. According to Heller, "Extreme caricatures of the Japanese like these plumbed the depths of fear." (p. 854) Goebbels also used the fear of defeat in his propaganda efforts. Bramsted (1965) states:

Another propaganda line pursued in this period did not dwell upon victory but rather on the sinister spectre of defeat. "Strength through Fear" could only be gained by producing the nightmarish image of the deeds the enemy would commit should Germany be defeated. Fear of this dreadful possibility was to make the last German man and woman prefer to die stoically than to live as a slave under a foreign yoke. (p. 316)

According to Winkler (1978), the Office of War Information (OWI) was formed by an executive order in June of 1942 six months after the United States entered the war to manage propaganda. Winkler (1978) states that:

OWI found itself in an awkward position from the very beginning. The first difficulties stemmed from the public fears of propaganda that emerged soon after World War I, lingered on for decades, and never really died away. (p. 1)

According to Winkler (1978), one of the main reasons for the public fear of propaganda was George Creel's tendency towards using overstatement and arguments that were "acrimonious."

During World War II, some of the OWI's propaganda publications were aimed at America's blacks. Winkler stated that the propaganda pamphlet *Negroes and the War* explained to Negroes what they had to lose under Hitler. The pamphlet showed blacks as soldiers and civilians in war work and other types of employment. The pamphlet depicted the accomplishments of Negroes and was meant to quell the doubts of many blacks about the war.

Music was used during World War II to distribute propaganda. One group that was targeted by American WWII propaganda songs was the Japanese. According to Moon (2003):

These songs illustrate how popular culture served as government propaganda and helped codify preexisting cultural assumptions about the Japanese to mobilize the American people for the war effort. They also drew upon a long lineage of racist thought, primarily about African Americans and applied to the Japanese, using music as a method of dissemination." (p. 333)

Moon (2004) claims that a survey taken in 1942 showed that the majority of those surveyed believed that the Japanese were treacherous. Anti-Japanese propaganda songs also used notions that were popular about Japanese religious practices and their racial inferiority, as well imagery of children and animals appeared in anti-Japanese songs.

Moon also states that:

To propagate and tap into these sentiments, the federal government pressured the music industry to produce patriotic music, including songs that dealt with the Japanese. Government officials understood the power of music and were interested in using it to mobilize the American people to support the war.
(Moon, 2004, p. 335)

One anti-Japanese song capitalized on the notion that the Japanese were child like and needed to be disciplined.

One such song was by Jenkins and Feagin in 1942 called *Spanking the Jap*, whose lyrics included:

What is that rap rap rap!
That's uncle Spanking the Jap
He would not listen to uncle's plea
So uncle put him across his knee . . . (p. 339)

Another mass medium that was used to distribute propaganda by the Germans during the Second World War was the newsreel. According to Bowles (2004), the production of newsreels was a top priority for the German army's Propaganda Abteilung in the German occupied zone of

France. The name under which the newsreels appeared in France was the *Actualités Mondiales* (AM). Bowles (2004) states that the AM:

Produced by UFA, Germany's largest state-supported film conglomerate, and distributed through a French subsidiary called the Alliance Cinématographique Européenne, the AM pushed French audiences to face the reality of their country's defeat and to accept the occupation—not in the name of ideological solidarity with the Nazis, but as a matter of necessity and self interest. (p. 47)

Bowles (2004) claims, "Such scenes were meant to persuade French spectators that German victory in the war was inevitable, and acquiescence the only viable option to ensure French national survival." (p. 48)

As evidenced by this section and the previous one, use of propaganda during times of war can be widespread. However, there are those who opposed the use of propaganda. There was one man in particular that opposed American use of propaganda, Senator J.W. Fulbright. According to Cone (2005), Fulbright was concerned that propaganda would become a standard procedure of the United States government during peace time do well as during war. Cone (2005) claims that:

Fulbright made sure that antipropaganda criticism became a recurring theme in Congress. Throwing the full weight and authority of his position behind his cause, he worked to raise public awareness about

covert and systematic government propaganda campaigns and their repercussions through hearings, speeches, televised interviews, and numerous publications. (p. 167)

According to Cone (2005), in 1941 Congress put heavy restrictions on the OWI, due to the belief of some that its propaganda practices violated the traditions of democracy. Although Congress had suppressed the OWI, Congress was also considering a bill which would institutionalize propaganda in government. The bill would provide Voice of America (VOA), America's international propaganda radio station with permanent funding. Senator Fulbright voted for the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948, which was different from the VOA, in the hopes that his educational exchange program would serve the same purpose as the pro-American broadcasts of the VOA.

Senator J.W. Fulbright was not the only person during WWII to oppose the use of propaganda. Well known author George Orwell opposed government propaganda. According to Kerr (2002), the matter of principle made Orwell unhappy about his work with the British Broadcasting Company (BBC). Although the BBC was a corporation and not a government department, it was understood that radio would have an very important role to play in propaganda once the

war began in 1939. During WWII the company came under the supervision of the Ministry of Information, which served as a model for the Ministry of Truth in Orwell's work 1984.

Hollywood Propaganda During WWII

During WWII, Fyne (1994) points out that President Roosevelt felt that the use of films was the most effective means of providing the public with information. Many of the films after Pearl Harbor were B-titles. B-title films were generally produced in a matter of weeks, were usually about an hour long, and lacked characterization. Fyne (2004) noted the Office of War Information (OWI) was the "official watchdog" of the movie industry, acting like a censor and monitoring the material that was produced. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, many studios began to make propaganda films. One such film was *Wake Island*. This film was different than other B movies that were produced during the time period according to Fyne. *Wake Island* was created from the headlines of the time, skillfully portraying the brave defense of Wake Island by the Marine Corps:

Paramount walked a tenuous line between fact and fiction. Naturally, the subplots were contrived, but the loss of the island was a staggering blow for America's morale. Hollywood, however, would manipulate that surrender into strong film propaganda, containing every element necessary to motivate moviegoers to praise their country and laud the honor of its Marines, while debasing the bestial Japanese invaders. (Fyne, 1994, p. 33)

According to Koppes and Black (1987) one important question that the OWI asked during this period of film propaganda, was "Will this picture help win the war?" Koppes and Black state that this question might seem absurd, "But in that grim year of 1943 propagandists as well as film makers took the question with deep seriousness." (p. 84)

Cold War

From the 1950's to the 1980's, the Cold War was fought between the United States and Communist countries such as Russia, Korea, and Vietnam. This particular war, although fought on the battlefield in some aspects, such as in Afghanistan in the 1980's, was primarily fought off the battlefield. During this period, rumors of nuclear arms proliferation by the Soviets abounded. During the Cold War, both the United States and Russia engaged in the use of propaganda. According to Snyder (1995), "Far from

concert and dance halls, in the mountains of Afghanistan, U.S. government media gurus were training sheepherders to be skilled TV cameramen so that they could chronicle the nightmare of Soviet military occupation" (p. xi)

Snyder also states that during this period, whatever worked was fair game and that the government ran the largest full-service public relations agency in the country. Also concerned with getting their propaganda message out, the Soviets would also plant false and embarrassing stories about the United States in Russian media. Snyder (1995) stated:

Probably the most bothersome Soviet press fabrication the entire cold war, charging the American government with developing the AIDS virus that would kill only blacks—an "ethnic weapon" as it would later be labeled by the Soviets—initially appeared in India's pro-Soviet daily newspaper, *Patriot*, in 1983. The accusation hit a nerve because the CIA did maintain unauthorized stockpiles of paralytic shellfish toxins, cobra venom, and other biological poisons at an army laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland. (p. 104)

In the early years of the Cold War anti-Communist propaganda was perhaps the most prevalent. According to Barson and Heller (2001):

Just the word 'communism' was provocative enough to inspire a host of irrational laws and decrees. People truly believed that Reds were under the bed—not to mention in the water supply, creeping through

the halls of government, and even spying from space.
(p. 8)

Anti-Communist propaganda in America during the Cold War was so effective that the American public allowed the government to persecute its opponents. Although there were many anti-Communist propaganda books and pamphlets during the time in the United States, there were also those that were produced by the government.

The Cold War period in America also saw its share of anti-propaganda dissent. Senator Fulbright continued to remain active during the "Red Scare" in America. According to Cone (2005), "Above all, Fulbright feared that an extremist demagogue like Hitler might rise to power in America. In 1950, he feared that the success of Sen. McCarthy's sordid anti-Communist frenzies might turn nightmare into reality." (p. 169) Cone also states that according to Fulbright, sources of the most dangerous consensus-building propaganda were those whom he called "super patriots." McCarthy's acts convinced him of this fact. Fulbright was also opposed to President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Crusade for Freedom," which duped Americans into donating hundreds of thousands of "Truth Dollars." The money that was donated by Americans was used to fund

Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Liberty, which CIA funded anti-Communist broadcasts. President Eisenhower, a "propaganda fanatic," was compared to the "Ministry of Truth" in George Orwell's 1984 by Senator Fulbright, who denounced the President's program.

The Cold War was not only fought between the United States and Russia, the British but between the British and Russia. According to Deery (2004), there was within the British Foreign Office a unit that activities were focused on anti-Communist propaganda. This unit was called the Information Research Department (IRD). Deery claims that efficacy of the propaganda used by the IRD depended on the correct use of political language:

Thus the IRD sought to put a 'spin' on the truth. It employed the weapon not of 'black' propaganda—strategically placed lies and false rumors, which remained the sanctuary of the foreign intelligence services—but of 'grey' propaganda (whereby deliberately slanted, non attributable information was designed and disseminated). (Deery, 2004, p. 16)

the IRD worked to make sure that their propagandists, broadcasters, journalists, and politicians used words and phrases that were the most effective in their articles and speeches. For instance, Deery (2004) claims that, "In describing 'imperialism', the adjective 'Russian' was preferred over 'Red' because the latter had 'favourable

associations'." (p. 17) The IRD preferred to use such terms as "Czar" and "Knout," which worked well with lines that harped on "barbaric," and "backward."

Hollywood Propaganda During the Cold War

During the Cold War period in America, many citizens feared the advance of Communism. During the 1950s it was common for schools to have drills to prepare children for the possibility of nuclear war. Many Americans stockpiled food and other supplies and built bomb shelters in their basements and backyards. Senator Joseph McCarthy is perhaps best remembered for his crusade against Communism in the United States. Many people in the entertainment industry were blacklisted because they were suspected of being a Communist. This fear was also capitalized on by the Hollywood film industry. Numerous films about Communism were made during the Cold War period. Some of these films include *Yankee Go Home: Communist Propaganda*, *Anarchy U.S.A*, *Kennedy's Cold War: Keeping the Commies Covered*, *Mao's Little Red Video*, and *Communists on Campus*.

After examining the literature about propaganda during periods of war and conflict, it becomes evident that the use of propaganda is not restricted to any one country. To the contrary, the use of propaganda has been

widely used by the United States, Britain, and Germany. Propaganda is perhaps one of the strongest weapons that a government can use during times of war and conflict to convince its citizens that the very war or conflict is not only necessary, but support of it makes those citizens patriots. Before the United States entered the WWI, Britain distributed propaganda aimed at convincing American public that supporting the war effort was the right thing to do. Once the country entered the war, President Wilson and the CPI distributed information claiming that it was American's patriotic duty to support the war. During WWII Hitler and the Nazi party used propaganda to convince Germans that Jewish people were inferior, thieves, rapists, and that they should be eradicated. The United States used the same dehumanizing tactics in their propaganda against Japan, portraying the Japanese as either little children to be disciplined or monsters. The Cold War Period and its use of anti-Communist propaganda led Americans to build bomb shelters and created a Salem-like witch hunt for Communists by the United States Senate, which was led by Senator McCarthy.

Theoretical Perspectives

As discussed in the Introduction, three theoretical perspectives are used to explain rhetoric and propaganda. These perspectives include: 1. The Communication Model, 2. Persuasive Appeals, and 3. Agenda Setting Theory. The end of this chapter will be used to describe how the aforementioned theoretical perspectives apply to the use of rhetoric and propaganda during World War I, World War II, and the Cold War.

The Communication Model or the Transactional Communication perspective can be used to describe all of the rhetoric and propaganda during World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Each of the examples of the propaganda that was used by the United States, Great Britain, Germany or Russia demonstrates that the message contained in the message was very important. For instance, When World War I began in Europe in 1914; the United States did not enter the conflict until three years after the conflict began. However, once President Wilson declared war, the messages that the CPI distributed were developed to create American support of the war effort. Many messages of the time frame led American's to believe that it was their patriotic duty to support the war effort. At the start of the war, Great Britain also

distributed messages to the American public which stressed that the war was in fact just and necessary. The propaganda distributed by Great Britain also encouraged the United States to join the War on the side of the Allies. In Germany and its occupied territories, tight control was exerted over the messages available to the public. The domestic press was given lists of weekly topics that they were not to discuss.

Propagandists use many of the primary and secondary emotions that were described in Chapter One to persuade. One of the most commonly used persuasive appeals in rhetoric and propaganda during the time periods discussed in the chapter was that of fear. The best example of propaganda appealing to the fear of the public was in Nazi Germany. Much of the propaganda that was distributed by the Nazi's during World War II encouraged German citizens to fear Jewish people. Nazi propaganda resorted to the use of fear to convince the German people that the Jews were barbarians that sought to rape and steal from the citizens of the "Motherland." The United States also made use of this tactic when referring to the Japanese during World War II. Propaganda portrayed the Japanese as someone that American's should fear. Just as the Nazi's

were doing in Germany, the United States spread the image that Japanese were inhuman creatures that should be feared. This is evidenced by propaganda that depicted Japanese as buck-toothed attackers.

During World War I, the Allies used despair (sadness) against German soldiers. The Allies would distribute leaflets over enemy lines that claimed that they were in fields of death. The leaflets challenged the soldiers by asking them why they were among the dead and encouraged them to return home. Another popular appeal to despair that was used by the Allies, was painting a grim picture of what awaited German soldiers when they returned home from the battlefield. This type of propaganda told the soldiers that when they returned home, they would be ignored by the rich and would be left to starve. Pictures were distributed that depicted crippled soldiers watching wealthy and robust Germans leaving restaurants and ignoring their countrymen that had fought for them.

According to Campbell et. al. (2000), Agenda Setting theory tells us what to think about. The theory also states that the media concentrates on a few issues and subjects then lead the public to believe that these issues are more important than others. A good example of agenda

setting by the Media was during WWII in Great Britain. When WWII began, the BBC understood that it would have a role to play in the war effort. The BBC came under the supervision of Ministry of Information during the war. The BBC and George Orwell took part in the propaganda effort and agenda setting by providing information that encouraged India to remain loyal to Britain despite the fact that they were being provided with German propaganda. Although controlled by the Germans, the film reels that were shown in occupied zone, such as France, were also an example of agenda setting, be it an example of agenda setting by government controlled media. The newsreels forced French audiences to accept their defeat and occupation. The films also encouraged the French to align their ideology with that of the Nazi's as a matter of not only necessity, but self interest. The films were a way for the Nazi's to shape the reality of the French in the occupied zones.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

The goal of this project was to identify what events led this country from September 11, 2001 to the beginning of the war in Iraq on March 19, 2003. Data for the project was obtained in a variety of ways. The first method was to examine descriptions of actual events between September 11th and the war in Iraq. Additional methods for obtaining secondary data included examining interviews, detailed accounts of the events that took place, magazines, and journal articles.

I also looked at how the "neoconservatives" of the Bush Administration talked about the need for war. The neoconservatives of the Bush Administration are Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld, and Richard Cheney. I also looked at materials produced to lend support for attacking Iraq including how the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and the White Paper were used in the propaganda effort. Newspaper articles were examined for common themes to identify possible propaganda distributed by the Bush Administration. The context in which the statements or references to intelligence were

examined to determine the role they played in the events that led to war.

Critical rhetorical analysis was used to analyze the rhetoric and propaganda of the Bush Administration. According to Howard (n.d.) on the Syracuse University's website, a critical response is not like when we might criticize one of our close friends. Howard claims, "Rather, it is a matter of one scholar evaluating the work of another scholar." The website noted that this type of critique is not inherently negative in nature. So in essence, this project evaluated the rhetoric of the Bush Administration.

Critical rhetorical analysis makes use of qualitative, interpretive research methods to analyze rhetorical texts. According to the Psychological/Sociological Paradigms developed by Burrell and Morgan (1979), the radical structuralist paradigm, recognizes a subjective perspective and is the viewpoint applied in the project. The Paradigm focuses on drastic change, liberation, and potentiality. The radical structuralist paradigm also emphasizes that over-throwing or rising above the limitations of existing social arrangements is important. This method allows the

rhetoric and propaganda leading to the war to be examined to determine how it was being used to limit the Administration and the American public.

Foss (2004) provides a definition of rhetorical criticism. Foss claims, "It is a qualitative research method that is designed for the systematic investigation and explanation of symbolic acts and artifacts for the purpose of understanding rhetorical processes." (p. 6) According to Foss' (2004) definition, rhetorical criticism consists of three principal dimensions. These dimensions include, "(1) systematic analysis as the act of criticism; (2) acts and artifacts as the objects of analysis in criticism, (3) understanding rhetorical process as the purpose of criticism." (p. 6)

A critical rhetorical analysis provided the researcher with the opportunity to examine the texts examined in the project from a more subjective perspective.

According to Brummet (1994), the job of a good rhetorical critic is to show people how they should think about certain things and find meaning in them. Good rhetorical criticism should also be liberating. Brummet (1994) asserts that, "It liberates you, the critic,

because it gives you the chance to probe into and develop some of these other potential ways of experiencing and understanding." (p. 77) According to Brummet (1994) it is also necessary that good rhetorical criticism liberate readers and listeners alike as they share the new insights that the critic has gained. Rhetorical criticism is also judged on the basis of the insight it provides into the effects of popular culture on society, and whether or not it expands the options available for society to experience that influence. Brummet (1994) also states that:

The critic is not only concerned about power; he or she is interventionist as well. The critic has some purpose or goal in mind in doing rhetorical criticism—as we noted before, the critic is on a mission. That means that for the critic, judgment of the text is inevitable and unavoidable. Judgment runs throughout all the insights offered by the critic. In suggesting that a text means this or that, the critic is also judging it. . . Objectivity is not possible for the rhetorical critic. (p. 102)

According to Foss (2004), the study of rhetorical criticism involves the study of symbols. Foss asserts that by practicing and studying rhetorical criticism, we become able to comprehend and articulate what it is that we like or dislike about something by investigating the symbols. The study of rhetorical criticism permits the ability to become more refined and selective in our

explanation, investigation, and comprehension of symbols and our responses to them.

Nothstine, Blair, and Copeland (1994), claim that the primary purpose of a critic of rhetoric is to speak or write to a particular audience and have an effect on the thoughts and acts of that audience. Nothstine et. al. (1994) also claim that each critic of rhetoric chooses an rhetorical event from an infinite amount of rhetorical events, which implies that the community the critic is a part of should pay special attention to the rhetorical event that is being addressed because it was chosen over other rhetorical events. Nothstine et. al. (1994) assert:

Thus the critic implies, by the choice of texts, that the chosen text is more significant than others for some reason. This does *not* mean that critics always must choose the most recent, obvious, newsworthy, prominent, historically influential, artful, famous, or infamous text to study. (p. 5)

Nothstine et. al. (1994) posit that rhetorical criticism must be prepared to respond to the concerns and the well being of the community in which it resides. This also means that critics of rhetoric should be prepared to speak to and within the communities in which they reside.

Nothstine et. al. (1994) also suggest that critics be

prepared to deal with those who challenge with or pass judgment on their work.

Limitations of the Project

The major limitation of this project was the inability to conduct primary research. Due to time limitations and budget restraints, it was not possible to conduct interviews with persons involved in the topic under investigation. Primary research would have provided the opportunity to learn how the American public responded to the rhetoric and the propaganda of the Bush Administration. Although it was not feasible to obtain primary data, there was an abundance of secondary data on the subject under investigation. This became a limitation because it was necessary to condense the information that was available. The research conducted for the project also relied heavily on the use of interpretive, qualitative research. The use of interpretive research resulted in the project being more subjective than objective in nature.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND FINDINGS

As stated in Chapter One, the purpose of this project was to answer two questions. The first question this project attempted to answer "Was what rhetorical event(s) allowed President George W. Bush to declare war on Iraq?" The second question the project attempted to answer was "How did the Bush Administration manage the crises that developed as a result of these rhetorical events and situations?" Thus, the chapter will be divided in to two sections. The first section will examine the rhetorical events that led this country from September 11, 2001 to the beginning of the war in Iraq on March 19, 2003 and the crises that developed as a result of those rhetorical events. The second section of the chapter will examine how the Bush Administration managed the crises that developed in response to the rhetorical events and situations that occurred.

Rhetorical Events Leading to the War In Iraq

September 11, 2001 is a day that won't soon be forgotten by most Americans. Many of us watched the World

Trade Center Towers becoming towering infernos in the New York skyline and then watched in horror as they crumbled to the ground and sent people fleeing for their lives. Others will remember the smoking wreckage at the Pentagon or the plane that crashed in the fields of Pennsylvania, which never reached the terrorists' intended destination.

Soon after these horrifying events in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C., the American public learned who was responsible for the terrorist attacks. The name of the group, Al Qaeda, and its leader, Osama bin Laden. Not long after this revelation by the Bush Administration, American troops began their advance into the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. Their mission was to hunt down bin Laden, members of his terrorist organization, and remove the leaders of that country (The Taliban) from power because of their support of Al Qaeda. To most Americans, this was clearly justified because it was clear that the Taliban supported Al Qaeda. It was also clear that there was a direct connection to Al Qaeda and the events of September 11th.

However, the pre-emptive war that was launched against Iraq was not clearly tied to the events of September 11th. The question then becomes, how did this

country move from bombing the mountains of Afghanistan to invading Iraq?

To answer this question, it is necessary to provide some background information on events that took place in this country pre-September 11th. The path that led the United States to the current war in Iraq began soon after the first conflict in Iraq (Desert Storm) ended.

According to Burrough, Peretz, Rose, and Wise (2004), the war in Iraq:

took root after President George H.W. Bush's decision to end the 1991 Gulf War abruptly, to pull back the troops that were slaughtering Iraqi soldiers by the thousands, and to end the headlong rush north toward Baghdad. During the 1990's the notion of toppling Saddam's regime was championed by a circle of neoconservative thinkers, led by Richard Perle, a former assistant secretary of defense for international security policy under President Reagan, and Paul Wolfowitz, an undersecretary of defense for policy for George H.W. Bush. (p.232)

Burrough et. al. (2004) assert that after George H.W. Bush left office, the "neoconservatives" tried to convince the Clinton Administration that it might one day be faced with the possibility of taking military action to prevent other regimes from the development or use of WMD. A letter was drafted in 1992 by Wolfowitz and called the *Defense Planning Guidance*. The letter was given to President Clinton in 1998 by Perle, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, and 15

others urging that there was a need for a regime change in Iraq and a more aggressive policy in the Middle East.

According to Buchanan (2004) the letter that requested a policy change and the ousting of Saddam Hussein was the, "aim of American foreign policy." Buchanan also asserts that, ". . . the signers all pledged, they would offer [their] full support in this difficult but necessary endeavor." (p. 46) Buchanan also asserts that the letter claimed that in the first part of the 21st century, the security of the world would be determined by how the President chose to deal with the threat.

Although the neoconservatives provided Clinton with the letter requesting the President's support in removing Saddam Hussein from power, the plan had been created five years before it was shown to Clinton. According to Bamford (2004), "Ironically, the plan was originally intended not for Bush but for another world leader, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu." (p. 261) The plan claimed that the removal of Hussein from power was the first step in making the Middle East into a region that was friendly to Israel instead of hostile and

signaled a departure from the former policy of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, which was peace oriented.

It is important to clarify exactly what or rather who neoconservatives (or sometimes referred to as neocons) are. According to Buchanan (2004), "The first generation (of neoconservatives) were ex-Trotskyites, socialists, leftists, and liberals who backed FDR, Truman, JFK, and LBJ." (p. 37) Buchanan also states that these neoconservatives began to shift their focus when McGovern captured the democratic party nomination for president in 1972, whose platform was to cut defense and for Americans to come home from Vietnam. According to Buchanan, the supporters drifted over to the Republican Party and became conservatives, which culminated in the triumph of Reagan.

Huband (2004) states that the neoconservatives were waiting in the wings when President Bush gave his infamous, "axis of evil," State of the Union Address in 2003, "Cheerleading, or perhaps leading, in reality was the group of right-wing republicans led by Wolfowitz, who had long been preparing for the return to office of an administration they could mold in their own image." (cited in Huband 2004, pp. 130-131) The neoconservatives banded together during the Clinton Administration, sharing their

views and eventually emerged as the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) on June 3, 1997. Disillusioned by the incoherence of the policies of the Administration, this led them to the conclusion there were four pressing imperatives. According to Huband (2004), the imperatives were:

- we need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future;
- we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values;
- we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad;
- we need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity and our principles. (p. 131)

According to Pilger (2002), Perle, one of the founding fathers of the PNAC, believed the following about the war on terrorism:

All this talk about first we are going to do Afghanistan, then we will do Iraq . . . this is entirely the wrong way to go about it. If we just let our vision of the world go forth, and we embrace it entirely and we don't try to piece together a clever diplomacy, but just wage a total war . . . our children will sing great songs about us years from now. (p. 13)

After the September 11th attacks, President Bush showed hesitation when the subject of invading Iraq was

brought up by other members of the Administration. The President needed to be persuaded more to believe that Saddam Hussein posed an imminent threat to the United States and that he was producing WMDs. According to Burrough et. al. (2004), when the President was confronted about the situation in Iraq, he would often respond, "Protect my flexibility." (p.234) Although President Bush was unsure of his stance on Iraq; the Vice President was clear about where he stood and his position. According to the Register-Guard (2004):

Dick Cheney, wields unprecedented influence over domestic and foreign policy in the White House—so much influence that some administration critics have suggested that the vice president is, take your pick, A) a co-president or B) a puppet master who controls his titular boss. (p. A12)

The Register-Guard claims that it was clear in the hours following September 11th that Cheney was at the hub of decision making and his actions led to the decision to invade Iraq without U.N. support or anything that resembled long-range planning for the postwar phase. The Register-Guard also states, ". . . Cheney, not Rice was framing choices and functioning as de facto national security adviser—just as Cheney supplanted the authority

of others, including Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet." (p. A12)

It became apparent that the rhetoric of the members of his Administration was beginning to change the President's mind about invading Iraq in the months following the attacks. According to Burrough et. al. (2004), British Prime Minister Tony Blair reminded President Bush to remember what his priorities were. Blair believed that the President needed to deal with Al Qaeda, Afghanistan, and the Taliban. President then pushed the Iraq issue by stating, "I agree with you, Tony. We must deal with this first. But when we have dealt with Afghanistan, we must come back to Iraq." (p. 238)

The first indication of the impending war with Iraq and the public rhetoric of the Bush Administration came in 2001 according to Mann (2004). Mann states that in November of that year, the focus of the administration began to shift from the war in Afghanistan, which was in its last stages to terrorists acquiring WMDs. Mann states, "On the surface the administration was offering merely one more rationale for the war on terrorism . . . the administration's new stress on weapons of mass

destruction was the earliest sign of a far broader campaign." (p. 317)

The rhetoric for going to war with Iraq began almost immediately after September 11th. Bamford (2004) states that it was apparent from notes written by Rumsfeld, that the attacks on the United States would be used as pretext in pushing a war against Hussein. According to Bamford, ". . . Rumsfeld wanted to 'hit S.H. at the same time.' The idea was to 'sweep' him up, whether 'related' to 9/11 or 'not.' Wolfowitz had the same idea and quickly began talking up an Iraqi connection in conference calls with other officials, including Cheney." (p. 285) Bamford (2004) also states that almost immediately after the terrorist attacks a secret intelligence unit was formed by David Wurmser, which went against normal channels and reported directly to Douglas Feith, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. The intelligence unit was given the name Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group. Bamford further asserts that those who were brought together to form the intelligence unit lacked experience:

He (Gregory Thielmann) said the makeup of the intelligence unit was a giveaway, indicating that they had no interest in true analysis . . . There's no logical explanation for the office's creation except that they [the Bush Administration] wanted

people to find evidence to support their answers about war. (Bamford, 2004, p. 290)

Lt. Col Karen Kwiatowski, agreed with Thielmann, saying the unit was providing propaganda and not intelligence. Bamford claims the purpose of Wurmser's group was to contribute to the rhetoric of the Bush Administration. Bamford describes the unit as essentially a pro-war propaganda cell, which produced evidence supporting the pretexts for attacking Iraq.

Another supplier of intelligence and propaganda according to Bamford (2004) was Ahmad Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress (INC). Bamford states that, "'The [INC's] intelligence isn't reliable at all,' said Vincent Cannistraro, the CIA's former chief of counterterrorism. 'Much of it is propaganda. Much of it is telling the Defense Department what they want to hear.'" (p. 294) According to Burrough et. al. (2004), Chalabi's family had fled Iraq in 1958. The INC, an exile group which was based in London, supplied the United States with intelligence that had either been proven suspect or fabricated by the CIA.

According to Corn (2003), "The Bush strategy was clear: hype the threat presented by Iraq, exaggerate and

embellish. Overstate Hussein's potential as a menace to America; overstate his ties to al Qaeda." (p. 219)

Wolfowitz was one person within the Bush Administration who used the strategy. According to Burrough et. al. (2004), Wolfowitz also claimed that there was a 10 to 50 percent chance that Saddam Hussein was involved in the September 11th terrorist attacks. According to Woodward (2004), ". . . Wolfowitz had edgy, hawkish views. The reasons for getting rid of Saddam were: It was necessary and it would be relatively easy." (p. 21) Woodward further asserts that Wolfowitz believed that it would be possible for the United States to send the military to overrun and confiscate Iraq's southern oil wells. In the days after the attacks, Wolfowitz and the other neoconservatives would not stop their quest for war in Iraq. The ideas that the neoconservatives presented as "draft plans." Woodward also claimed:

"The only strong advocate for attacking Iraq at that point was Wolfowitz, who thought war in Afghanistan was dicey and uncertain . . . In contrast, Iraq was a brittle oppressive regime that might break easily with an opposition yearning to topple Saddam." (p. 26)

The Bush Administration also based much of its rhetoric supporting the war in Iraq on the premise that

Iraq had an alleged agreement to purchase uranium from Niger. According to Bamford (2004), much of the information was based on letters that had been obviously blended together from several older documents that were genuine. The phony documents from Niger were created from letters that had been stolen from the Nigerien embassy in Rome on January 2, 2001. The intention of the documents was to create the impression that Iraqi ambassador Wissam al-Zahawiah's trip to Niger in 1999, was to arrange for a shipment of uranium to Iraq in 2000. The documents also implied that the ambassador might have something to do with the attacks on September 11th.

One of the final instances of rhetoric of the Bush Administration before the war began in Iraq was a result of the discovery of aluminum tubes. One of the key allegations the Bush Administration used to promote the war was Iraq's capability to produce WMDs. According to Burrough et. al. (2004), in the fall of 2001 a delivery of aluminum tubes from China was intercepted on its way to Iraq en route to Jordan. It was thought by officials in the administration that the tubes were going to be used like centrifuges to spin uranium at high speeds so that it could be used in the production of Nuclear weapons.

Although Thielmann was not convinced, then Director General of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet was sure that the tubes were meant for that purpose.

The rhetoric of the Bush Administration culminated in 2002 when President Bush delivered his State of the Union Address to the country. According to Burrough et. al. (2004), the man who wrote the address, David Frum, was directed by Michael Gerson to make the best case for war with Iraq. During the speech, the phrase "axis of evil" was coined to describe Iran, North Korea, and Iraq.

According to President Bush (2002):

States like these and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic. (cited in Burrough et. al., 2004, p. 240)

Burrough et. al. further claim that the President would go on to say that the administration would be prepared to strike pre-emptive wars so that it would not allow the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten America with the world's most dangerous weapons.

Crises That Developed as A Result of The Rhetoric of The Bush Administration

One crisis that developed as a result of the rhetoric of the Bush Administration was the pressure that was placed on CIA intelligence officers charged with finding evidence that Iraq had been involved with September 11th and that the country had WMDs. According to Burrough et. al. (2004):

many Administration officials reacted strongly, negatively, and aggressively when presented with information that contradicted what they already believed about Iraq . . . Intelligence officers who presented analyses that were at odds with pre-existing views of senior Administration officials were subject to barrages of questions and requests for additional information. (p. 242)

Burrough et. al.(2004) claim that CIA analysts were often urged by their superiors to provide evidence that Iraq possessed WMDs. When the analysts submitted papers that lacked proof of their existence, they often felt pressure from their supervisors who were constantly questioning about why they chose a certain piece of information over another. Basically the CIA analysts were being interrogated and asked to defend their findings.

The major crisis that developed was a result of the rhetoric of the Bush Administration using the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) as the basis for the White

Paper. As mentioned previously, the Administration believed that Iraq was attempting to purchase uranium from Niger to make WMDs. According to Burrough et. al. (2004), in the fall of 2001 a delivery of aluminum tubes from China that were to be delivered to Iraq were intercepted en route to Jordan. It was believed that the tubes were to be used as centrifuges to spin uranium at high speeds so that it might be used in the production of nuclear weapons. Greg Thielmann of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and a scientist from the Department of Energy were not convinced. However George Tenet, then Director of the CIA, was sure that the tubes were meant to be used as centrifuges. Burrough et. al. (2004) claimed that based partially on the tube evidence, the CIA created the NIE. The NIE, a 90-page document, is the highest form of reporting that can be done by the United States intelligence community. According to the document, the tubes were strong evidence that Saddam Hussein was reinstating the uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's nuclear weapons program.

Burrough et. al. (2004) further asserts that the NIE was deemed to be insufficient by Congress to deliberate on the subject of the country remaining at war or peace. In

order to come to a decision about whether or not Hussein was an imminent threat, Congress and the American people needed to be provided with a document they could read. The CIA was asked to provide a White Paper or a condensed version of the NIE document. It was the request of the Congress to create the document that led to the development of a crisis for the Bush Administration. Burrough et. al. (2004) also claims that when the CIA was asked to provide the White Paper, not only was the original document condensed, but facts from the original document were distorted to create an even greater threat to the United States. Evaluations that were cautious in the NIE turned in to statement of fact and conclusions were not just abbreviated, but completely revised in the white paper. The White Paper created a scary picture for the United States and can be considered one of the strongest pieces of evidence used to support the war in Iraq.

Response of the Bush Administration

After all that has happened on the journey that led this country from September 11th to the current war in Iraq, some might wonder how the Bush Administration

responded to these events once it was proven that there was no definitive evidence proving the existence of WMD. The overwhelming response of the Bush Administration after the war in Iraq began was denial about the fact that they had been wrong about the existence of WMDs. According to Hersh (2004):

There was, in contrast, little self-doubt or second-guessing in the Pentagon over the failure to immediately find the weapons. The Pentagon adviser to Special Plans told me in May 2003 that the delay "means nothing." (p. 241)

Hersh (2004) also states that they were waiting to hear information from scientists that could provide the Pentagon with information about where the weapons were. Another Pentagon official who works for William Luti, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, said that the weapons were hidden in the mountains of Iraq or transferred to a friendly country. President Bush himself also resorted to denial when faced with accusations that information about Iraq having WMDs was wrong and supported a report by David Kay, which fell short of claims that there were WMDs. According to Hersh (2004), the President felt vindicated by the report and believed that it showed that Hussein was a threat to the United States and a serious danger. Vice

President Cheney also remained unfazed when the documents from Niger were proven to be fakes. In an interview in September 2003, Cheney claimed that a British dossier's claimed that Iraq was attempting to obtain uranium from Africa and that the Administration's previous beliefs had been validated.

This chapter sought to answer two questions. The first question that the chapter attempted to answer was what rhetorical event(s) allowed President George W. Bush to declare war on Iraq? The second question that the chapter attempted to answer was how did the Bush Administration manage the crises that developed in response to these rhetorical events and situations?

After examining the rhetorical events that took place in the Bush Administration after the terrorist attacks on the United States, it becomes obvious how this country moved from September 11, 2001 to the first pre-emptive war in the country's history being launched against Iraq. In the days following the terrorist attacks, neoconservative members of the Bush Administration including Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, began planting the idea that Iraq was somehow supporting terrorists and had plans to develop WMDs. The Bush Administration also obtained much

of its evidence supporting the war in Iraq from phony documents that were supposedly stolen from the Nigerian embassy in Rome, which claimed that the Iraqi ambassador had agreements with Niger to purchase uranium (used to make nuclear weapons). One of the final rhetorical events that lead this country from September 11th to the current war in Iraq was the creation of the White Paper. The White Paper, a condensed version of the NIE, distorted many of the findings in the original NIE to make Iraq seem like a more imminent threat than it actually was.

The overall response of the Bush Administration to the rhetorical events and situations that occurred is simple, denial. When faced with questions about WMDs and why they had not been found in Iraq, the response of the Bush Administration was that the weapons were in the mountains or had been hidden in a friendly country. These responses demonstrated that even if the Bush Administration had failed to provide the American public with definitive proof that Iraq had WMDs, they would not admit they were wrong. If the Bush Administration admitted that the war in Iraq had been based on shaky evidence at best, they would be admitting that they had sent many of this Nation's children to their death under

false pretenses. It seems as if the Bush Administration was working under the premise that they had the best of intentions and they were justified in invading Iraq.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

After examining the rhetorical events that led this country from September 11th to the current war in Iraq, it becomes evident that some of the theoretical perspectives discussed in chapter one and chapter two apply to the situation under examination. The theoretical perspectives that apply to these events are persuasive appeals and agenda setting.

As noted previously, persuasive appeals are categorized by both primary and secondary emotions. The persuasive appeal that the rhetoric and propaganda of the Bush Administration appeared to target the most was that of fear. Just the mention of WMDs and all they entailed was sufficient to instill fear in members of the Administration and the American public. Members of the Bush Administration used the fear appeals to convince the President that Saddam Hussein was producing WMDs that might possibly be used on the United States. Members of the Administration used the falsified Nigerien documents to plant the fear that Iraq had an agreement with Niger to

purchase uranium ore, which was to be used in the production of nuclear weapons. Fear was also used by the Administration when it claimed that confiscated aluminum tubes were going to be used by the Iraqis to spin uranium at high speeds, a process that is involved in making nuclear weapons. Another persuasive appeal that was used by the neoconservatives of the PNAC was pride. The neoconservatives took their pride and also their arrogance in the democratic system and turned it in to a potential opportunity to spread democracy throughout the Middle East and make it a place with a more sympathetic regime, so that they might further their own goals.

The second theoretical perspective that applies to the rhetorical events that led this country to war is agenda setting theory. Agenda setting involves the media conveying the information to the public that it feels is important. Although the agenda is typically set by the media, the Bush Administration exerted control over the agendas set by the media. The Administration's involvement with agenda setting became apparent when it began embedding journalists during the war in Iraq. According to Schechter (2003), the idea to embed journalists with troops took root in 2002, when the

Pentagon approached editors with the opportunity.

Schechter also claims that the strategists at the Pentagon, who were in the process of planning the war, expected journalist to broadcast certain things over their airwaves. The images that the journalists were to portray needed to be proud, positive, and patriotic. Journalists were not allowed to provide sensitive information and were limited in terms of filming dead bodies.

Media stories led the public to have misperceptions about the war in Iraq. According to Kull (2004), a study revealed that the media led to several misperceptions. These misperceptions included: 1. 49% of those who were surveyed believed that United States had found evidence proving that Iraq had ties to Al Qaeda, 2. 22% of those surveyed believed that the United States had proof of weapons of mass destruction, and 3. 23% of those surveyed believe that the public opinion of the world favored America going to war with Iraq. Kull also states, "When the press are reluctant to challenge what government leaders say, they can simply become a means of transmission for administration rather than serve as a critical filter for information." (p. 65) According to Barstow, Stein, and Kornblut (2005), the Bush

Administration also influenced the agenda setting of the media by providing them with prepackaged news. Barstow et. al. claim that the Administration used public relations and provided the media with news reports that were prepackaged. Barstow et. al. state that, "Some reports were produced to support the administration's most cherished policy objectives, like regime change in Iraq . . ." (para. 6) These prepackaged news pieces were broadcast in some of the United State's largest television markets, which included New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, and Atlanta. Barstow et. al. also claim that the prepackaged news distributed by the Administration appeared to be like any other segment on the local news.

Conclusions

After researching the topic of my project, there were many things that I expected to find. I expected to find that the Bush Administration had been untruthful to the American public about Iraq's WMDs. I also expected to find that there would be instances where the government would take advantage of the fear that was in the hearts of many and use that to further their desire to go to war with Iraq.

Examining the rhetoric of the Bush Administration leading to the current war in Iraq confirmed my first expectation, that the Bush Administration had been untruthful about Iraq's possession of WMDs was true. The strongest piece of evidence that supports the Administration had been untruthful to the American public was the phony documents stolen from the Nigerian embassy in Rome. Although it was found that the documents were phony, the Bush Administration still used the information contained within them as their strongest piece of evidence supporting a war in Iraq. The only thing that mattered to them was that the documents claimed the Iraqi ambassador had an agreement to purchase uranium from Niger, which was to be used to produce WMDs.

My research also revealed that when the Bush Administration learned of aluminum tubes that were intercepted en route to Iraq from China, they claimed that these tubes were going to be used as centrifuges to spin uranium and was evidence of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. However, the Administration failed to inform the public that there was disagreement about whether or not the tubes were meant for the enrichment of uranium. Greg Thielmann and a scientist from the Department of Energy

were not convinced that the tubes were meant to be used as centrifuges. George Tenet, former director of the CIA, chose to believe that the aluminum tubes were evidence that Iraq was producing WMDs.

The aluminum tube evidence prompted the CIA to write the NIE document, which stated that the tubes were strong evidence that Hussein was producing WMDs. When Congress requested that they be provided with a document that was more conclusive than the NIE, the White Paper was created, which led the administration to be untruthful to the American public yet again. The White Paper was an extremely condensed version of the NIE. The document had taken information that was presented cautiously in the NIE and turned it in to statement of fact. Essentially the White Paper turned information that was deemed insufficient by Congress to declare war to presenting the scariest case for war possible.

My second expectation was also confirmed by the rhetorical events that are mentioned above. The Bush Administration used the phony documents from Niger, the aluminum tubes, the NIE, and the White Paper to take advantage of the fear that America was feeling after September 11th. The Administration understood that people

in the United States feared the possibility of more terrorist attacks on the country. The neoconservatives in the Bush Administration took advantage of this fear by leading the public to believe that Saddam Hussein had WMDs that he planned to use against the United States.

However, what I did not expect to find was that this quest for a regime change in Iraq had been in the minds of so called, "neoconservatives" for many years. Before beginning this project, it was almost unthinkable for me that there was a group of people in this country that would take the suffering of the thousands, perhaps millions, to fulfill their idea of what they believe the world should be.

Reflecting back to the literature review and what was discovered about propaganda during times of war and conflict, I have learned that rhetoric and propaganda played a major role in bringing our country from the events of September 11, 2001 to the start of the war in Iraq on March 19, 2003. The use of rhetoric and propaganda made it possible for the neoconservatives to first convince President Bush that going to war with Iraq was the right decision, then take the fears of the American public and use them to justify a war in Iraq.

This is similar to the way that rhetoric and propaganda was used during WWI, WWII, and the Cold War to gain support for war.

The neoconservatives in the Bush Administration accomplished their goal of going to war with Iraq by using rhetoric and propaganda in different ways. The rhetoric and propaganda of the neoconservatives in the Administration began almost immediately after the events of September 11th. After the terrorist attacks, the neoconservatives began pushing the Iraq agenda by telling President Bush that they believed that the country was involved in the attacks on the country. The alleged intention of Iraq to purchase uranium from Niger further pushed the agenda of the administration by providing more information supporting the assertion that Iraq had WMDs. Finally, the NIE and the White paper were the final pieces of rhetoric used by the administration to justify their case for war. The White Paper essentially frightened the American public into accepting that a war in Iraq was the best course of action. The media reported all of these "facts."

Dyer (1942) asserted that if propaganda is successful, it emphasizes all of the extremes and does not

often admit that there is a middle ground. Dyer (1942) further asserts that a propagandist is led to take a portion of the truth and dress it as either black or white, which results in statements that are part truth and part lie. It seems that the neoconservatives and other members of the Bush Administration were using propaganda according to Dyer's definition. The Bush Administration had information that was part truth and part lie (the phony documents from the Nigerien embassy). The administration either believed that this information was complete or they did not care if it was incomplete.

Recommendations

After completing the research for the project, there are several recommendations for future research. The first suggestion is that future researchers should consider conducting primary quantitative research. Survey research might discover how Americans were affected by news coverage and the suggestions of WMDs by the Bush Administration leading to the beginning of the war in Iraq. Future researchers might also compare the rhetoric of "left-" versus "right-" wing focused media. Doing so

will enable researchers to present the focus of the
"opposition," which was not discussed in this project.

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